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MARSHALL v. PACIFIC UNION CONFERENCE
OF SEVENTH-DA Y AD VENTISTS:




The doctrine of church-state separation is embodied in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."' These related provi-
sions-the establishment clause and the free exercise clause-have
presented the courts with complex questions of constitutional law con-
cerning the government's power to regulate for the benefit of society
and the conflicting right of individuals and religious organizations to
be free from such regulation.2 As a result, Jefferson's metaphorical
"wall of separation"3 between church and state has been subjected to a
great deal of judicial remodeling during the past thirty years.4 Recent
* Member, third-year class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationshp Between the 'Establishment"
and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 142 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Moore, "Es-
tablishment" and "Free Exercise"]. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 812-85 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
The religion clauses were made applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise
clause) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause).
3. The Supreme Court employed Jefferson's "wall of separation" language in Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). Jefferson first used this terminology in a letter
to a group of Baptists in 1802. Id The Court's insistence on deriving rules of law from
figures of speech has caused it great difficulty in defining the proper relationship between
church and state. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1 (1965).
4. The Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
signalled the beginning of a period of intensive judicial analysis of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment, particularly the establishment clause. The Court has generally moved
from a strict separation (no aid) position in Everson (a parochial aid case raising establish-
ment questions) to an accommodation of religious interests theory in Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (a challenge to a release time program involving establishment clause issues)
and to a neutrality tleory in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (an establishment
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Supreme Court decisions have expanded the individual's right to the
free exercise of religion.' At the same time, however, the government
has been expanding its role in regulating discriminatory labor practices
in both the public and private sectors.6 It was inevitable that at some
point the First Amendment's religion clauses would clash with the gov-
ernment's exercise of power under remedial labor legislation.
Such a conflict arose in Marshall v. Pacfic Union Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists,7 wherein the United States Department of
Labor filed a complaint against the Pacific Union Conference, charging
that religious organization with violations of the equal pay provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).S The defendants claimed
that enforcement of this statute would constitute impermissible govern-
mental interference and entanglement between church and state, thus
violating the church's constitutional rights under both the free exercise
and establishment clauses.9 In considering these First Amendment
challenges, the Marshall court applied an establishment clause analysis
and concluded that the church was required to obey the equal pay pro-
visions of the FLSA. I° In the past, however, the courts have consist-
ently treated a religious liberty-labor legislation conflict as a free
clause challenge to prayer and Bible-reading in public schools). See ger:ral, P. KAUPER,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 59-67 (1964) [hereinafter cited as K \UPER, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION].
5. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Vcmrer, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). See generally KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supd-a note 4, at 40-43;
Marcus, The Forum of Conscience. Applying Standards Under the Free Ex, reise Clause, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1217, 1220 [hereinafter cited as Marcus, Forum of Conscienccl.
6. See generally Note, Towarda Constitutional De nition of Religion. 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1083-84 (1978); Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLR,4, ariJ Parochial School
Teachers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Free Exercise
Clause].
7. No. CV 75-3032-R (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1977) (memorandum opinion) [hereinafter
cited as Pacific Union case]. In a similar suit pending in a federal district court for the
Northern District of California, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a
Title VII sex discrimination suit against the Pacific Press Publishing Association, a Seventh-
day Adventist publishing house. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, No. CV 77-1619-
CBR (N.D. Cal. 1978).
8. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). The equal pay provisions
of the FLSA are known as the Equal Pay Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 20(,d)(1) (1976). The
Equal Pay Act provides, in part, that an employer shall not discriminate "between employ-
ees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which
[the employer] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions .... " Id § 206(d)(1).
9. Defendants' Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law at 7-8, Pacific Union
case, supra note 7 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Memorandum of Contentions of Fact
and Law].
10. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 8. See notes 125-34 and accompanying text
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exercise problem, and consequently have applied a balancing test to
determine which interest should prevail." Utilization of the establish-
ment clause excessive entanglement defense in a labor case was there-
fore a unique departure from precedent.
This note first discusses the values underlying the establishment
and free exercise clauses, and traces the development and application
of the Supreme Court's current tests for resolving church-state contro-
versies under each clause. Particular attention will be given to the
Court's free exercise analysis of conflicts arising between religious free-
dom and governmental labor legislation. A short explanation of the
background facts and constitutional issues raised by the Marshall ac-
tion will follow. The memorandum opinion of United States District
Court Judge Manuel Real will be discussed with particular emphasis
on the court's application of the excessive entanglement doctrine.
The final section of the note attempts to develop a standard for
determining the proper constitutional test to apply to religious liberty-
labor legislation conflicts. It will be suggested that this particular ac-
tion involved free exercise values which should be considered under a
free exercise balancing test rather than under the excessive entangle-
ment standard of the establishment clause. In the alternative, it will be
suggested that the case may fall under the establishment clause through
an application of the concept of benevolent neutrality. 2 The discus-
sion will continue with an evaluation of the applicability of the entan-
glement doctrine to cases involving a conflict between the government's
regulatory power, derived from the commerce clause, and the freedom
of religion guaranteed under the First Amendment, with particular em-
phasis on recent religious liberty-labor legislation decisions applying
the entanglement doctrine. The note will conclude with an evaluation
of the significance of Judge Real's decision with respect to the defend-
ants, those similarly situated and society at large.
infra. For a discussion of the establishment clause test, see notes 25-43 and accompanying
text infra.
11. Eg., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974); Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (Ist Cir. 1971); Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d
1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424
F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954). For a discussion of the free exercise balancing test,
see notes 51-57 and accompanying text infra.
12. For a discussion of benevolent neutrality, see notes 158-63 and accompanying text
infra.
Fall 1978]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
I. First Amendment Freedom of Religion Standards
In accordance with the distinct values underlying the religion
clauses,' 3 the Supreme Court has generally applied separate tests under
each clause to determine whether the free exercise or establishment
clause has been violated.' 4 While the Court has had no trouble stating
the purposes of these clauses, it has encountered great difficulty agree-
ing on the standards which should govern them.' 5 The sources of free
exercise and establishment problems are generally quite different,16 and
the perspective from which the alleged violations are measured differs
in the two types of cases. 7 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
looked to the historical values implicit in each clause to develop the
respective constitutional standards.
A. Establishment Clause
I Establishment Clause Values
The establishment clause was designed to protect against the en-
actment of laws which establish an official religion,'" or which confer
benefits upon some religious groups in preference to others or generally
13. The purpose of the establishment clause is to maintain church-state separation,
while the free exercise clause seeks to protect the individual's religious liberty. Compare
notes 18-24 and accompanying text infra with notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
14. Compare notes 25-43 and accompanying text infra with notes 51-57 and accompa-
nying text infra. A court considering a religious claim under the First Amendment is faced
with the threshold question: what is a religion? The Supreme Court has approached this
issue but no majority opinion has squarely decided it. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). For a discussion of this issue,
see Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity r Vital Realty?, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 15 (1973); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Re/:gion, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1056 (1978).
15. "[I]t is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Es-
tablishment and Free Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that
should govern their application." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 6')4 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
16. Compare notes 18-24 and accompanying text infra with notes 44-46 and accompa-
nying text infra. There are, however, some cases in which both free exercise and establish-
ment questions are raised. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (parochial aid); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemp-
tion for religious organizations); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (religious exemp-
tion from welfare law). See generally Moore, "Establishment" and "Frie Exercise," supra
note 2, at 146-54.
17. See Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis.
L. REv. 217, 267-68 [hereinafter cited as Galanter, Religious Freedoms]. A violation of the
establishment clause "is measured by the views of the marketplace" while a denial of free
exercise demands an assessment from the perspective of the religious adherent. Id
18. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-33 (1962).
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aid religion.' 9 The inhibition as well as the advancement of religion is
prohibited by the clause.2" The intent of the drafters of the Bill of
Rights in inserting the religion clauses was to prevent the establishment
of a national religion.2' Looking to the framers' original intent, the
Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education22 stated its interpreta-
tion of the nature of the conduct forbidden by the establishment clause:
[N]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any reli-
gion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonat-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a
"wall of separation between church and State."23
Recently, the Court succinctly, reiterated these establishment concerns:
"It is sufficient to note that for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
19. Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: .A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REv.
679, 679 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dodge, SociologicalApproach]. For a general discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the establishment clause, see KAUPER, RELI-
GION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 59-67; Piekarski, Nyquist and Public Aid to
Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 255-62 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Piekarski,
Nyquist].
20. This concept was discussed by Professor Moore in the following statement:
"Broadly speaking, a law respecting an establishment of religion is a civil regulation either
favoring or. disfavoring religion. It is true that the term 'respecting' in the establishment
clause is a neutral term and thus encompasses laws disfavoring as well as favoring religion,
but the primary element in the usual establishment case is that of favoring religion." Moore,
"Establishment" and "Free Exercise," supra note 2, at 150 (footnotes omitted). See generally
Galanter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 17, at 267.
21. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1961).
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Id at 15-16 (citation omitted). See generally R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND RELIGION 76-95 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]; Kauper, The Walz Decisior"
More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REv. 179, 180-81 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Kauper, Walz Decision]; Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Edu-
cation, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. Rv. 213, 241 (1973);
Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 709
(1968).
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in religious activity."'24
The concern of the establishment clause, then, is to maintain a sep-
aration between government and religion. In order to maintain this
separation, the Court has developed a standard for determining what
degree of interaction between church and state is constitutionally per-
missible under the establishment clause.
2. The Establishment Clause Test
The Supreme Court currently employs a three-pronged25 test to
determine whether governmental action or a statutory regulation vio-
lates the tenets of the establishment clause.26 This, however, was not
always the applicable test. In School District v. Schemp,27 the Court
applied a two-part test to determine whether Bible-reading and prayer
in public schools violated the neutrality required by the establishment
clause. In considering the particular statute in question, the Court first
inquired whether it had a secular legislative purpose, and secondly,
whether the principal or primary effect of the statute was one which
neither advanced nor inhibited religion.28
The two-pronged Schempp test was subsequently expanded in
Walz v. Tax Commission29 by the addition of a third prong.30 The
24. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
25. It has been suggested that the Court has added "divisive political potential' as a
fourth factor in this test. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J., separate
opinion, joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ.). There has also been some resistance to Chief
Justice Burger's three-pronged test in recent opinions of the Court. See. e.g., Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (four justices joined in the part of the opinion applying the
three-pronged test); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion
applied the three-pronged test). But see New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125
(1977), where the Court applied the excessive state involvement test with six justices joining
in the opinion. The Court has also emphasized that these "tests" are really no more than
helpful signposts or guidelines. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1975);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U S. 672, 678 (1971).
26. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a general discussion of the
Court's development of standards under the establishment clause, see Piekarski, Nyquist,
supra note 19.
27. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
28. Id at 222. The secular purpose/primary effect test, although often referred to as the
Schempp or Allen test, actually originated in McGowan v. Maryland, 36t, U.S. 420, 445, 453
(1961). See 16 VILL. L. REv. 374, 375 & n.15 (1970). Although the test was first applied in
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. t02, 612-13 (1971),
cited Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), in its discussion of the two-pronged test.
The two-part test was firmly established as a measuring standard for cases dealing with
parochial school aid in Allen. Id at 243.
29. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Waz involved a challenge to a state property tax exemption
granted to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship.
30. Several of the Justices have objected to this extension. For example, in a concurring
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Court sought clearly to delineate the boundaries of permissible govern-
mental involvement with religion under the establishment clause
through the formulation of the excessive entanglement test.3 ' In con-
sidering the church-state relationship, Chief Justice Burger stated: "We
must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion."3 Although the entangle-
ment terminology is an addition to the establishment clause test, the
basic prohibition against governmental involvement in religious affairs
is not. The First Amendment religion clauses have always been inter-
preted to mean that there must be some degree of separation between
church and state.33 The term "excessive entanglement" may therefore
be viewed as the Court's new yardstick for measuring the degree of
separation required by the establishment clause, and for determining
how far the Court can go in applying the concept of benevolent neu-
trality in its attempt to walk the fine line between the free exercise and
establishment clauses.34
This new doctrine, whose application forms the basis of this note,
has been applied by the Court as a distinct third test,3" and has nar-
rowed the scope of the effect test by requiring legislation that may not
opinion in Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), Justice White, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, stated: "I have never understood the constitutional foundation for this
added element [excessive entanglement]; it is at once both insolubly paradoxical ...
and-as the Court has conceded from the outset-a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable bar-
rier.' " Id at 768-69 (White, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J.). Justice White went on
to note that he did not perceive any difference between the first and third parts of the three-
pronged test and that the entanglement test appeared "no less 'curious and mystifying' than
when it was first announced". Ad. at 769.
31. 397 U.S. at 674-75. In describing the area of permissible involvement, the Court
declared: "The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion
or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmen-
tal acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Id at 669.
32. Id at 674. See generally Kauper, Walz Decision, supra note 23.
33. "Underlying the twin religion clauses of the first amendment is the idea that the
state and the churches have separate functions to perform and that the state may neither
intrude into the affairs of the churches nor actively intervene in religious matters." Kauper,
Walz Decision, supra note 23, at 201 (footnote omitted). The entanglement doctrine can also
be seen as an outgrowth of the Everson total separation doctrine. Kauper, Everson v. Board
of Educatior 4 Product of the Judicial Will, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 307, 325 (1973).
34. For a discussion of benevolent neutrality, see notes 158-63 and accompanying text
in/ra.
35. The excessive entanglement test is employed by the Court as an "independent meas-
ure of constitutionality." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-85 (1971). See generally
Kauper, Public Aid/or Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon, DiCenso and
Tilton Cases, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 567, 583 (1971); Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
HARV. L. REV. 3, 167-79 (1971).
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have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion to be struck
down because of a sufficient degree of governmental interference with
religion.36 It would therefore be possible for a particular statute to pass
the purpose and effect tests but at the same time be held unconstitu-
tional because it would constitute too much governmental control over
the internal affairs of the religious institution.37
The entanglement standard is far from absolute: consequently,
there is some debate as to how much entanglement constitutes excessive
entanglement and how far the doctrine should be extended.38 The
Supreme Court is itself cognizant of the fact that excessive entangle-
ment is very difficult to evaluate. The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman39
stated, "Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular rela-
tionship."4 Some critics have also suggested that the test is both con-
fusing and frustrating for the Court to apply.41
In spite of the confusing nature of entanglement, the Court has
continued to rely on this concept as an integral part of its establishment
clause analysis. 2 The Court does not reach the entanglement question
36. The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon 1), did not deter-
mine whether the legislation in question had the primary effect of advancing religion be-
cause it had already found excessive entanglement. Id at 613-14. The Court emphasized
the fact that total separation between church and state is not possible and therefore the
Court must consider "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes" to determine whether the degree of involvement is excessive. Id at 614.
37. The Court in Walz indicated that looking at sponsorship and support does not end
the inquiry; rather a court must consider each prong separately. 397 U.S. at 674.
38. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 174 (1971).
39. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon!, a parochial school aid case, was the first decision in
which the Court applied all three prongs of the establishment test. Id at 612-13.
40. Id at 614. The Lemon I Court did, however, lay down some guidelines for deter-
mining excessive entanglement: "[W]e must examine the character and purposes of the insti-
tutions that are benefited, the nature and aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority." Id at 615.
41. See note 30 supra. Professor Giannella, one of the foremost critics of the test, con-
tends: "[I]f the concept of 'excessive entanglement' is to be taken seriously, it raises more
questions than it answers. Its broad and amorphous nature makes predictability an impossi-
bility unless the Court refines and reduces it to more precise guidelines .... There is the
likelihood that entanglement will turn into a convenient label to help the Court announce
decisions arrived at on other grounds more difficult to articulate in terms of consistent legal
theory." Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State
Entanglement, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 147, 148 [hereinafter cited as Giannella, Lemon and
Tilton]. For a succinct summary of the arguments against the application of the excessive
entanglement test, see Piekarski, Nyquist, supra note 19, at 263-64. See also Note, Govern-
ment Assistance to Church-Sponsored Schools: Tilton v. Richardson and Lemon v. Kurtzman,
23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 113, 122-23 (1972).
42. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-54 (1976).
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in every situation,43 but it has become an ever present hurdle with
which to contend in establishment cases. Therefore, in its considera-
tion of establishment clause questions the Court currently evaluates the
challenged legislation by considering the three separate factors of secu-
lar purpose, primary effect and excessive entanglement, and the legisla-
tion may be declared unconstitutional under any one of these analyses.
A religion clause issue, however, may instead involve a free exercise
question; consequently, courts must also look to the specific values of
free exercise and measure the alleged First Amendment violation under
the test formulated to determine constitutionality under the free exer-
cise clause.
B. Free Exercise Clause
1. Free Exdrcise Values
In contrast to the values underlying the establishment clause, the
purpose of the free exercise clause is to secure an individual's religious
liberty by prohibiting a civil authority from invading the realm of an
individual's practice of religion.44 A free exercise claim presents two
interrelated contentions: first, that a belief or practice burdened by gov-
ernmental interference is religious in nature,45 and second, that such
interference is prohibited by the First Amendment's free exercise
clause.46
43. For example, if the legislation fails under either of the first two prongs the Court
may end its inquiry. E.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); see Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establish-
ment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. L. REV. 107, 121 (1974).
44. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963). The Schempp Court also
delineated the contrasting nature of free exercise and establishment: "[I]t is necessary in a
free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment
Clause violation need not be so attended." Id at 223. See Moore, "Establishment" and
"Free Exercise," supra note 2, at 148, 151. For a general treatment of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the free exercise clause, see Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause,
83 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Clark, Guidelines]; Marcus, Forum of
Conscience, supra note 5.
45. An extended discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this note. See generally
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious:
United States v. Seeger and the Scope ofFree Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966); Com-
ment, Defning Religiorn Of God, the Constitution and the D.4.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 533
(1965).
46. Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 546, 546 (1963). The
"typical" free exercise problem arises from "the multifarious regulations of the welfare state:
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Since Reynolds v. United States47 was decided in 1878, the Court
has applied the principle that an individual's religious beliefs are abso-
lutely protected from governmental interference but the freedom to act
in the name of religion remains subject to some regulation for the pro-
tection of society.48 Although some critics have asserted that the be-
lief/action distinction is no longer viable,49 the courts continue to rely
on this principle as a basic precept of free exercise anal sis.5 ° The pur-
pose of the free exercise clause, then, is to protect the individual's right
to freedom in his exercise of religion from interference by the civil au-
thority. Since all conduct which is arguably religious in nature is not
absolutely protected-because of the competing interests of the individ-
ual and society-the Supreme Court has developed a standard by
which to measure constitutionality under the free exercise clause.
2. Free Exercise Test
In order to resolve the conflict between a governmental regulatory
statute and an individual's right to the free exercise of religion, the
compulsory education, financing of higher education, control over business hours, child la-
bor, licensing of occupations and activities, union activity, use of land and buildings, health
measures, and old age security." Galanter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 17, at 268.
47. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Reynolds was one of the Mormon polygamy cases.
48. Id at 166. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (11)53); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (lN40). See generally
KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 37-38; Comment, Religious
Accommodation Under Sherbert v. Verner." The Common Sense of the 1fatter, 10 VILL. L.
REv. 337, 339 & n.9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Religious Accommodation].
49. See Marcus, Forum of Conscience, supra note 5, at 1233-35.
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972); GraN v. Gulf, Mobile &
Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 101 (1971); Mitchell
v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir.), cert. de'nied, 347- U.S. 1013
(1954). The Court in Yoder observed that "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in
logic-tight compartments." 406 U.S. at 220. In some cases, the Court has gone so far as to
allow an individual's action, as well as belief, to be absolutely protected by the free exercise
clause. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20 (exemption granted from educational
requirements because of undue burden on Amish religion); Sherbert v. Vrner, 374 U.S. 398,
402-03 (1963) (individual's free exercise claim upheld against state's interest in maintaining
unemployment fund). See Comment, Religious Accommodation, supra note 48, at 342. In
discussing the accommodation principle, Professor Dodge stated: "[T]here is a narrow area
in which the free exercise clause allows the state to accommodate religion in spite of this
strong prohibition against establishment: if the legislature creates a substantial burden upon
a class of citizens, it may carve out exemptions where the burden relates directly to an im-
portant aspect of religion." Dodge, Sociological Approach, supra note 19, at 705 & n.92.
The California Supreme Court further expanded the scope of this protection in People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), in which an accommodation
for religious practices resulted in an exemption from a criminal statute. The California
Court upheld the use of peyote in religious ceremonies despite a general criminal prohibi-
tion against its use.
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Supreme Court applies a balancing test." Under this standard the
Court attempts to weigh the burden imposed on the individual's free
exercise of religion against the possible harm to the legislative scheme
if religious exemption is granted. In order for the legislative scheme to
survive, the government must show that its interest is compelling5" and
that there is no less restrictive alternative.53 The balancing test has be-
come the dominant feature of the Court's free exercise analysis and has
been applied in cases raising free exercise, in contrast to establishment,
considerations.
There are two balancing tests utilized by courts in First Amend-
ment analysis: ad hoe balancing and definitional balancing.54 The for-
mer requires a court to weigh the interests of the state against those of
the individual and then determine whether the state's infringement of
the individual's free exercise rights is justified. The latter approach
requires a court to define the actual interests being balanced and to
differentiate between protected and unprotected expression.5 6 Cur-
rently, the Supreme Court employs a free exercise balancing test which
combines elements of both ad hoc and definitional balancing by first
defining the interests of the state and the individual and then balancing
those interests. 7 A survey of the Supreme Court's major free exercise
decisions illustrates the evolution of this free exercise balancing test.
51. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
In contrast to the utilization of a balancing approach in free exercise questions, it has
been suggested that there is no justification for any balancing when a conflict arises concern-
ing an "absolute" First Amendment right. Justice Hugo Black stated that he believed that in
this area, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights have withdrawn all power from the govern-
ment to act and that there is therefore no justification for balancing. Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 874-75 (1960). A similar viewpoint was also expressed by
Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in the McGowan case. After discussing the Court's
balancing of the state interest in providing a common day of rest and recreation against a
threat to the First Amendment freedom of religion, Justice Douglas stated, "There is in this
realm no room for balancing. I see no place for it in the constitutional scheme." McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In spite of these suggestions that the balancing test has no place in the consideration of
"absolute" First Amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court has continued to apply a balanc-
ing test to free exercise problems and has not indicated that it intends to abandon this
standard.
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963)).
53. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
54. For an in-depth discussion of the types of balancing tests employed by the Court
under the free exercise clause, see Marcus, Forum of Conscience, supra note 5, at 1239-42.
55. Id at 1239-40.
56. Id at 1241.
57. Id at 1242.
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In Braunfeld v. Brown" and Gallagher v. Crowz Kosher Super
Market, Inc. , two of the Sunday-closing cases,6° the Court applied an
ad hoc balancing test to determine whether a state law barring the sale
of certain commodities on Sunday violated the free exercise rights of
Sabbatarians.61 The Court held that the balancing test did not require
a state's legislative scheme to be struck down as interfering with free
exercise where it imposed only an indirect burden 6z on the free exercise
of religion, unless the state could accomplish its purposes by means
which would not impose such a burden.63 The direct/indirect burden
distinction was significant because it indicated that the Court consid-
ered the state's power to legislate to be of primary importance, 64 and
consequently did not afford protection to those suffering an indirect
burden on their free exercise unless there was a less restrictive alterna-
tive. This limitation on free exercise protection was subsequently
narrowed by the Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner,"6 which greatly
expanded the constitutional protection accorded the free exercise of
religion.67
The Sherbert Court considered a case in which an individual's free
exercise of religion, her freedom to worship on Saturday without the
58. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
59. 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (plurality opinion).
60. There were four Sunday-closing cases decided by the Court on the same day. The
other two were McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and Two Guys v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961). The Braunfeld and Crown Kosher cases posed a free exercise ques-
tion-whether Sabbatarians could be punished for working or shopping on Sunday if their
religious beliefs required them to observe another day of worship-while the McGowan and
Two Guys cases posed an establishment question-whether the state can prescribe Sunday
as a community day of rest. The Court never reached the free exercise issue in the latter two
cases because the appellants did not allege any injury to their religious freedoms and there-
fore did not have standing to sue. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 429-30; Two Guys v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. at 592.
61. A "Sabbatarian" is "one who regards and keeps the seventh day of the week as holy
in conformity with the letter of the decalogue." WEBSTER'S THIRD NFW INTERNATIONAL
DIcrIoNARY (1969).
62. An indirect burden exists when a legislative regulation does not make a religious
practice itself unlawful, but instead incidentally places a hardship, such as economic loss, on
individuals who choose to engage in a particular religious activity or to refrain from acting
because of certain religious beliefs. Note, A Braunfeld v. Brown Testfor Indirect Burdens on
the Free Exercise of Religion, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1964).
63. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
64. Id at 606.
65. Id at 607.
66. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
67. The Sherbert decision is the first case in which the Court upheld a free exercise
claim not supported by free speech interests. Pfeffer, The Supremacy if Free Exercise, 61
GEO. L.J. 1115, 1139 (1973).
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loss of state unemployment benefits, conflicted with the state's interest
in protecting its unemployment fund.68 In applying a balancing test,
the Court first considered whether Mrs. Sherbert's statutorily mandated
disqualification from securing benefits imposed any burden on her free
exercise of religion. It was determined that the ineligibility ruling
forced Mrs. Sherbert "to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion [Saturday worship] in order to accept
work, on the other hand."69 The Court then considered whether some
compelling state interest justified such a substantial infringement on
the appellant's First Amendment right. Consideration of the state's in-
terest in protecting the fund from dilution through fraudulent claims
indicated that this was not a situation giving rise to grave abuses that
would endanger paramount state interests.70  The Court therefore
found that the state had failed to show the necessary compelling inter-
est and held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on
appellant's right to the free exercise of religion.7'
The Sherbert decision, by introducing a constitutionally required
68. The case involved a situation where a Seventh-day Adventist was discharged for
refusal to work on Saturday. The state refused to grant her unemployment compensation on
the ground that her refusal to work on Saturdays, causing other employers to refuse to hire
her, disqualified her under the state's unemployment statute for failure to accept suitable
work. 374 U.S. at 399-401.
69. Id at 404. The Court also rejected the assertion that the denial of unemployment
benefits was constitutional because those benefits were not Mrs. Sherbert's "right" but
merely a "privilege." The Court stated that "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege." Id
70. Id at 406-07. The state suggested only a possibility that the unemployment fund
might be diluted and an employer's scheduling of Saturday work hindered by the filing of
fraudulent claims by unscrupulous persons alleging religious objections to Saturday work.
The Supreme Court did not consider this issue because it was not raised before the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was unwilling to assess the importance of an
asserted state interest without the views of the state court. Even if such a contention had
been made below, the Court found "no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering
and deceit." Id at 407. Moreover, even if the possibility of dilution of the fund and disrup-
tion of scheduling were present, the state would be required to show that there was no less
restrictive alternative available. Id
Consequently, the Court found that the state interest asserted in Sherbert was not as
compelling as the interest in providing a uniform day of rest upheld in Braunfeld. In the
Braunfeld case, the Court found great administrative burdens and competitive advantages
which were not present in Sherbert. Id at 408-09.
71. Id at 406-09. See Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv.
327, 329 (1969). The Sherbert Court did not actually reach the issue of whether there was a
less restrictive alternative available because the state had not shown a compelling interest.
374 U.S. at 407.
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accommodation" in an indirect burden case, indicates how far the
Court has progressed in the development of its free exercise analysis.73
Commenting on the Court's opinion in Sherbert, Professor Kauper
stated, "The Court applied a more stringent test than it has usually
applied when indirect encroachments upon First Amendment freedoms
are involved. Sherbert opens up new vistas on religious liberty and
suggests a reconsideration of results reached in some earlier cases."74 It
is still questionable, however, whether the free exercise clause should
be extended so far as to create exemptions from laws of general
application.
The Court's other significant decision involving a special religious
exemption required by the free exercise clause appeared in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.76 The Court in Yoder considered a situation in which the indi-
72. The term "accommodation" has a special meaning within the concept of discussions
involving the relationship of religion and law. "The basic idea is that government may
accommodate its legislation and programs to the religious character, needs, and interests of
Its people." Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, in
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 17 (Giannella ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Kauper,
Schempp and Sherbert].
73. Kauper, Walz Decision, supra note 23, at 181-82.
74. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 42-43. It has been
suggested that Sherbert and Braunfeld cannot be reconciled since the burden on Mrs. Sher-
bert was of precisely the same type as that imposed on the Orthodox Jewish merchants.
MORGAN, supra note 23, at 147; TRIBE, supra note 2, at 854. However, the Sherbert Court
indicated that there was a "strong state interest" in Braunfeld that was lacking in Sherbert.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09. See note 70 supra.
75. For a discussion of religious accommodation, see notes 153-57 and accompanying
text infra. The conflicting nature of the religion clauses presents the problem that a religious
exemption, allegedly required by free exercise concerns, might constitute a "special privi-
lege" violating the establishment clause. Kurland, Of Church and Staie and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29, 96 (1961). See generally KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW 22 (1961); Galanter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 17, at 288; Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development-Part I-The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1398-99 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Giannella, Religious
Liberty]; Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause V'alue, 77 YALE L.J.
692, 705 (1968).
The Sherbert opinion indicated that the free exercise clause sometimes requires special
religious exemptions and that this accommodation does not in fact constitute a violation of
the establishment clause. 374 U.S. at 409. See KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 4, at 20; Dodge, Sociological Approach, supra note 19, at 705. See generally
Galanter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 17, at 295; Kauper, Waz Decision, supra note 23,
at 197.
76. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The defendants were members of the Amish faith who refused
to send their children to public school after the eighth grade. The parents were convicted of
violating the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law. The Amish believe that secon-
dary education, by exposing their children to worldly influences, interferes with the religious
development of Amish children and their integration into the Amish way of life. The de-
fendants therefore claimed that their free exercise rights were being %iolated by the state
requirement of compulsory education. Id at 210-11.
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vidual's right to the free exercise of religion, the right of Amish parents
to provide private secondary educational instruction to insulate their
children from worldly influences, conflicted with the state's interest in
compulsory high school education. In applying a balancing test,7 7 the
Court first considered the sincerity and importance of the Amish belief
in separation from the outside world and what effect compulsory edu-
cation would have on this interest. It was determined that the Amish
religious faith and their lifestyle are inseparable and interdependent.78
The Court further declared:
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, exposing
Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals,
and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering
with the religious development of the Amish child and his inte-
gration into the way of life of the Amish faith community at the
crucial adolescent stage of development, contravenes the basic re-
ligious tenets and practice of the Amish faith. .... 79
In view of the strong Amish interests found by the Court, it was
incumbent on the state to show that its interest in compulsory educa-
tion was so compelling as to override the established religious practices
of the Amish.80 The Court examined the interests which the state
sought to promote through compulsory education and "the impediment
to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed
Amish exemption."'" The state claimed that some degree of education
was necessary to prepare citizens to intelligently participate in the dem-
ocratic political system and to prepare individuals to be self-reliant and
77. The Court rejected the notion that the state's interest in compulsory education was
absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. Id at 213-15. A balancing
test was applied by the Court because the state's interest "is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children . I..." ld at 214.
78. Id at 216-17. This determination was significant because the claims asserted by the
Amish, in order to have the protection of the religion clauses, had to be based on religious
rather than philosophical or personal beliefs. The Court found that the Amish lifestyle was
"not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living." Id at 216.
79. Id at 218.
80. Id at 214.
81. Id at 221. The Court rejected the state's assertion that religious "actions" are not
protected by the First Amendment. The Court stated that there are some areas of conduct
protected by the free exercise clause and which are consequently beyond the state's power to
control. Id at 219-20. The Court also rejected the claim that the compulsory education law
applied uniformly to all citizens and therefore did not discriminate against any religious
group. The Court stated that "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion." Id at 220.
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self-sufficient members of society. The Court accepted the validity of
these assertions but concluded that the additional two years of required
education would do little to serve these interests, especially in view of
the established informal vocational educational program of the
Amish. 2 Consequently, the Court determined that the state had not
met the burden of showing a compelling interest in the enforcement of
its compulsory education laws and that the Amish religious liberty in-
terest must therefore prevail.
From an evaluation of the Court's opinions in Sherbert and
Yoder, one can conclude that an individual's claim of free exercise is
given substantial protection by the Court as against the state's right to
apply general regulatory statutes. It is only when the state can show a
compelling interest in the legislative scheme and no alternative method
of accomplishing its purposes that a statute imposing a burden on the
free exercise of religion can be upheld. The balancing test is thus the
standard of constitutionality which the Court applies to claims that
state action is interfering with the right to the free exercise of religion.
The next section of the note discusses the application of the free exer-
cise balancing test to one particular type of church-state controversy.
C. Balancing Test Applied to Labor Cases
The balancing test has been applied by courts in labor cases in-
volving conflicts between the government's regulatory power, as mani-
fested in protective labor legislation, and the free exercise of religion.8 3
Cases dealing with the possible unconstitutional conflict between the
First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom and labor laws have
therefore been considered under the free exercise rather than the estab-
lishment clause.8 4 An analysis of several such cases illustrates the
courts' focus under the balancing test in religious liberty-labor legisla-
tion conflicts.
82. Id at 221-22, 235-36; see Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 232-33 (1973).
83. Eg., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor law upheld against
free exercise claim); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (gth Cir. 1974) (pay-
ment of labor union dues upheld against First Amendment objection); Linscott v. Millers
Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (lst Cir. 1971) (governmental interest in union shop outweighed free
exercise interest); Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cer.
denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971) (government interest in union shop under Railway Act out-
weighed free exercise interest); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(NLRA collective bargaining requirements upheld against free exercise claim); Mitchell v.
Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954)
(FLSA held applicable to religious publishing house).
84. See cases cited in note 83 supra.
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The Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts85 utilized the bal-
ancing test to uphold a state child labor law prohibiting the street sale
of magazines by minors against a free exercise claim of the right to
distribute religious literature. The Court was faced with the claim of
Mrs. Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, that the state was burdening her free
exercise right, as well as that of her niece, to distribute literature ac-
cording to the dictates of her religion. 6 In addition, Mrs. Prince
claimed that her right to authority in her own home and in the rearing
of her children was being infringed. 7 Under the balancing standard,
the Court considered the societal interest, as manifested in child labor
legislation, in protecting children from the harmful effects of child la-
bor.8 The Court recognized the importance of the religious liberty
claim and the parental interest in raising children, but determined that
the state's interest outweighed the free exercise claim: "[T]he state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare; and. . . this includes, to some ex-
tent, matters of conscience and religious conviction." 9 Consequently,
the child labor law was upheld against the Jehovah Witnesses' free ex-
ercise right to redistribute religious literature.90
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Mitchell v. Pilgrim
Holiness Church9 that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was ap-
plicable to a church-related publishing house. The publishing house
asserted that enforcement of the FLSA against the religious organiza-
tion would inhibit their free exercise right to carry on religious work
without governmental interference.92 In response to the free exercise
claim, the Mitchell court stated that the free exercise of religion was
never intended as a guarantee of immunity for a violation of the law.93
Looking to the specific legislative purpose of the FLSA, the court then
85. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
86. Id at 159, 161-64.
87. Id at 164.
88. Id at 165-67.
89. Id at 167.
90. Id at 170. The Court emphasized the fact that the state's power to control chil-
dren's conduct is much broader than the scope of the state's authority over adults. Id at
168. It has been suggested that in light of subsequent decisions such as Sherbert and Yoder,
the Court's ruling in Prince is somewhat suspect. See Marcus, Forum of Conscience, supra
note 5, at 1266; Giannella, Religious Liberty, supra note 75, at 1395-96.
91. 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954).
92. Id at 882; see also Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition at
4, Pacific Union case, supra note 7 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Petition for Writs of
Mandamus and Prohibition].
93. 210 F.2d at 885. See Note, King's Garden Inc. v. F C.C.: Loosening the Political
Hands ofCaesar, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 619, 636 (1975); cf Meyers v. Southwest Region
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balanced the governmental interest in insuring "to the workers of the
United States engaged in the production of goods for commerce a mini-
mum wage sufficient to maintain a minimum standard of living which
Congress deemed to be necessary for their well-being" against the reli-
gious organization's claim of restraint on their free exercise of reli-
gion.94 The court held that the application of the FLSA, a remedial,
nondiscriminatory labor regulation, did not violate the defendants' free
exercise rights, focusing on the fact that the FLSA did not in this case
prohibit the free exercise of religion.95
In another labor case, Gray v. Gu, Mobile & Ohio R.R. ,96 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee's discharge for refusal
to pay union dues and fees in lieu of joining the union did not violate
the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The plaintiff
alleged that the requirement of payment of union dues infringed upon
his free exercise of religion because of his adherence to the Seventh-day
Adventist religious belief barring support of union activity.97 The court
applied the balancing standard to determine whether the specific gov-
ernmental interest expressed in the Railway Act could justify the inter-
ference with plaintiffs competing interest in choosing employment
without sacrificing his religious convictions. The decision emphasized
the court's belief that religious liberty cannot be a superordinating fac-
tor in every case:
We do not doubt that plaintiff Gray has a genuine and sincere
religious conviction that his financial support of a labor union
would be wrong, but it is simply not possible in an ordered soci-
ety to allow every aspect of religious belief to stay the hand of
government under the aegis of the First Amendment. 98
With this view in mind, the court held that the governmental interest in
the union shop outweighed the burden imposed on plaintiffs religious
freedom and in such a situation it is the religious adherent who must
suffer the burden.99
Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 88 So. 2d 381 (1956) (First
Amendment does not exempt a church from the Workman's Compenation Act).
94. 210 F.2d at 884.
95. Id at 883-84. It is significant to note that the Mitchell court, in considering a First
Amendment claim in a situation quite similar to that in the Marshall action, spoke only in
terms of free exercise and did not discuss establishment clause principles.
96. 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
97. Id at 1072.
98. Id
99. Id "The First Amendment commands us to be vigilant in protecting the free exer-
cise of religion, but religious conscience cannot be a superordinating factor in every situa-
tion. The hand of government is not to be stayed where a compelling governmental interest
outweighs the infringement upon First Amendment rights." Id Accord, Linscott v. Millers
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Collective bargaining requirements under the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA) were upheld in Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NRLB 00
against an employer's claim that his religious beliefs prevented him
from dealing with a labor union. The plaintiff, a member of the Sev-
enth-day Adventist Church, asserted that he had a conscientious objec-
tion to bargaining with a labor union and that the NLRA's collective
bargaining requirement therefore constituted a violation of his right to
the free exercise of religion.10 ' In response to the free exercise claim,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although
the freedom to believe is absolute, freedom of conduct may be curtailed
or regulated for the protection of society. 102 After considering the spe-
cific legislative purpose of the NLRA, the court balanced the gover-
mental interest in collective bargaining against the plaintiff's claim of
infringement on his free exercise of religion. The court found that
"[t]here can be little doubt that there is a compelling public interest in
applying the good faith collective bargaining requirement uniformly to
all employers and labor unions."'0 3 Consequently, the court held that
the application of the NLRA requirements to the plaintiff did not vio-
late his free exercise rights, especially in view of the fact that the NLRA
is concerned with an employer's conduct under the Act rather than with
his belie in the Act."°
These labor decisions indicate that the courts, when confronted
with a conflict between labor statutes and freedom of religion, have
turned to the free exercise balancing test to resolve the constitutional
questions. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court in re-
cent years, even under the balancing test, has moved away from a
rather narrow interpretation of free exercise to a standard which allows
the protection of free exercise claims against all but the most compelling
state interests.' 05 The application of the free exercise balancing test to
the labor cases essentially follows the same pattern as the Court's anal-
Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971); see Note, The "Free Exercise" Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution is No Defense to a Union Shop Agreement Al-
lowed Under the Railway Labor Act, 8 Hous. L. Rav. 387 (1970).
100. 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
101. Id at 884-85.
102. Id at 886-87.
103. Id at 890. In Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974), the
Ninth Circuit held that federal labor policy overrides a First Amendment objection to pay-
ment of union dues. Accord, Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956).
104. 424 F.2d at 889.
105. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
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ysis did in the Sherbert, Yoder and Sunday-closing cases.'0 6 The courts
in the labor cases focus their attention, however, on the specific legisla-
tive purpose underlying the challenged statute rather than generalized
statements of the state's interest.1
0 7
II. Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists
Consideration of the decisions dealing with labor legislation-reli-
gious liberty questions indicates that the courts have traditionally ana-
lyzed these conflicts under the balancing test of the free exercise clause.
It was against this background that a United States District Court in
Marshall v. Pacic Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists °8 was
called upon to weigh the competing interests of the United States De-
partment of Labor and the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
A. Background
On September 5, 1975, the United States Department of Labor
filed suit against the Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-day Advent-
ists under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 0 9 charging violations
of the Act's equal pay provisions. The statute provides that an em-
ployer shall not discriminate
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which [the employer]
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex. . . for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions .... 'to
These provisions of the FLSA became applicable to the defendants
under the Education Amendments of 1972, which stipulated that exec-
utive, administrative and professional employees of educational institu-
tions previously exempt from the equal pay requirements were now
protected by these provisions."'
The Department of Labor alleged that the Pacific Union Confer-
106. See notes 58-82 and accompanying text supra.
107. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750-75 (1961); Lin-
scott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness
Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 883-84 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954).
108. Pacific Union case, supra note 7.
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
110. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). See generally Murphy, Female Wage
Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (1970).
111. Education Amendments of 1972, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976). The defendant had
previously been exempt. See generally Ross & McDermott, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: A
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ence had violated the FLSA through the head-of-household pay scale
employed in 147 church schools and colleges within California.' 1 2
Under this scheme, an employee classified as head-of-household was
paid a higher wage and given "fringe benefits" such as health coverage,
rent allowance and educational scholarships for dependent children. " 3
The designation head-of-household theoretically applied to any indi-
vidual who was the sole or majority supporter of a family;' 4 in prac-
tice, however, this classification was generally applied only to married
men."
5
In response to the Labor Department's allegations, the defendants
argued that their pay scale was in line with the FLSA and that even if it
was not, the First Amendment granted them absolute protection from
governmental regulation." 6 In the alternative, the defendants claimed
that their right to free exercise of religion would be violated by the
governmental investigation, surveillance and regulation necessary to
insure compliance with the equal pay regulations of the FLSA. The
Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Ross & McDermott].
112. Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum of Fact and Law at 10, Pacific Union case, supra
note 7.
113. L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1977, (Metro), at 1, col. 2; Ms., Apr., 1978, at 22. For a detailed
description of how the head-of-household system worked in one Seventh-day Adventist in-
stitution, see Plaintifi's Supplemental Brief Re Class Action Proceedings, Silver v. Pacific
Press Publishing Ass'n, No. CV 73-0168 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
114. L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1977, (Metro), at 1, col. 2.
115. Id
116. Defendants' Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law, supra note 9, at 7-9.
The defendants argued that the First Amendment religious liberty guarantees provide
complete immunity from laws of general operation whenever such a law or regulation con-
fficts with some religious belief or practice. Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus
and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 22. To support this contention they relied upon James
Madison's statement in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that
"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institu-
tion of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance." Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissent app. I).
The defendants' reliance on this short statement of Madison's, viewed out of its proper
historical and textual context, is unsupportable. It is very difficult and hardly practical for a
modem court to apply the religion clauses using an historical perspective to interpret ideas
which are based on outdated social, political and economic conditions. Giannella, Religious
Liberty, supra note 75, at 1383. Professor Giannella has stated that "[a]s the social, political,
and economic milieu evolves, so must the content given the first amendment." Id at 1383-
84.
Notwithstanding Madison's statement, the courts have not granted total immunity to
religious organizations and individuals in the free exercise area. The Court's adherence to
the belief/action doctrine, although it is no longer an absolute distinction, and its formula-
tion and application of the balancing test, conclusively indicate that claims of free exercise
of religion do not provide complete immunity from the regulations imposed by civil laws,
particularly those laws enacted to protect the public peace, health and welfare.
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Pacific Union Conference asserted that this governmental action con-
stituted an unconstitutional interference with the church's relationship
with its denominational "ministers and missionaries" and with the reli-
gious mission of the school system.'f 7 Finally, in advancing the estab-
lishment clause claim, the defendants contended that the Labor
Department regulation necessary under the FLSA would constitute a
significant intrusion into the work of the church and its relationship
with its religious workers, thereby constituting an excessive entangle-
ment between government and church." 8 On the basis of these free-
dom of religion claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
Judge Real was therefore required to consider the constitutionality of
the application of the FLSA to a religious organization.
B. Memorandum Opinion on Motion for Summary Judgment
After resolving the question of jurisdiction," 9 the district court
ruled on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court
first evaluated the free exercise claims and then considered the estab-
lishment clause challenge. The defendants had asserted that their em-
ployer-employee relationship was protected against enforcement of the
FLSA's equal pay provisions because such enforcement would inhibit
the religious organization's free exercise of its religious belief that the
government should not become involved in the employment relation-
117. Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 2:
"For [Seventh-day Adventists] the education of their young ... is an essential part of their
church's divine mission. The church considers it intolerable, both as a matter of constitu-
tional law and as a matter of fact and doctrine, that agents of the government conduct inves-
tigation, surveillance and regulation of their religious activity." Id at 4.
118. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, Pacific Union case, supra note 7.
119. The question of the court's jurisdiction over a particular question must be deter-
mined before the court can validly consider the substantive issues. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL
PROCEDURE 3-4, 11 (1972). Here the question was raised as to whether the court had juris-
diction over a case involving the wages paid to non-clergy religious employees. The
jurisdiction of civil courts has been rather narrowly defined in this area. See Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). There are several situations where the civil courts will
generally refuse to become involved in religious disputes of an ecclesiastical nature: (1)
church property disputes, (2) cases where the claims of both parties are based on religious
factors and (3) matters involving the clergy. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976). See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicolas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952); L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 301-02 (rev. ed. 1967).
An extended discussion of this issue is beyond'the scope of this note. See generally
TRIBE, supra note 2, at 871-80; Casad, The Establishment Clause aud the Ecumenical
Movement, 62 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1964); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Dis-




ship between the church and its parochial school employees. 20
The court initially stated that if there was a conflict between the
FLSA provisions and the church's conduct which impinged upon the
church's religious freedom, the government would be required to show
a compelling interest.' 2 1 The court went on to note, however, that
under the Braunfeld rule, courts will not "strike down, without the most
critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on
the exercise of religion ... ,22 In order to determine whether or not
the church's beliefs were being burdened, the court looked to the writ-
ings of Ellen White, a recognized prophet of the church. In her book
Evangelism, commenting on inferior wages for women, she stated:
This is making a difference, and selfishly withholding from such
workers [women] their due. God will not put His sanction on any
such plan. Those who invented this method may have thought
they were doing God-fearing, soul-loving labours. But there will
be an account to settle by and by, and then those who now think
this exaction, this partiality in dealing, a wise scheme, will be
ashamed of their selfishness.
123
Relying on this statement, the court determined that the defendants
could not prove an impingement on their exercise of religion. 124
After dismissing the free exercise claims, the court went on to dis-
cuss the establishment clause challenge primarily in terms of the exces-
sive entanglement prong of the establishment test.' 25 To determine
whether the Labor Department's proposed actions constituted an im-
permissible involvement with defendants' religious activities, the court
looked at excessive entanglement from both a qualitative and quantita-
tive perspective: "Qualitative in that the standard must respect the con-
cem for separation of church and state. Quantitative in the sense
that-on a consideration of the nature of the intrusion into religion-it
120. Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 4.
121. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 3.
122. Id at 3-4 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). The Braunfeld
Court characterized this permissible type of legislation as that which does not make unlaw-
ful the religious practice itself. Id The court's reliance on the Braunfeld rule is questionable
in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See note
74 supra.
123. E. WHITE, EVANGELISM 492-93 (1946).
124. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 4-5. It can be questioned whether this one state-
ment by a church prophet should have been taken by the court as a specific, inclusive state-
ment of official church policy. In contrast, the defendants pointed to the Biblical injunction
that the man should be the head of the house. Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus
and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 13, 22-23. See Ephesians 5:21-33.
125. For a discussion of excessive entanglement, see notes 29-43 and accompanying text
supra.
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cannot be 'excessive.' "126 Because of these considerations, courts must
carefully consider the cumulative impact of the entire relationship. 127
The opinion indicated that "[e]ntanglement is not ...an absolute
principle of application of the First Amendment to all contact between
religious organizations and government."'2 8 It is therefore necessary
for a court addressing an entanglement problem to also consider the
substance of what is to be accomplished by the legislation, rather than
merely looking to the form in which the purpose of the Act is to be
carried out. 129 In this regard, the Marshall court ascertained that the
Secretary of Labor's only interest was to see that the defendants' em-
ployees were assured the minimum and nondiscriminatory wage guar-
anteed to them under the equal pay provisions of the FLSA. 130 The
court indicated the proper perspective from which entanglement must
be viewed: "Excessive entanglement cannot be measured simply quan-
titatively by the size of the religious organization involved. [There are
also] qualitative concerns which are the essence of the prohibition
against the 'establishment of religion.' These qualitative concerns re-
quire consideration of the nature of the intrusion. ... - Viewed
from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, the proposed Labor
Department actions were found by the court not to constitute excessive
entanglement because "the involvement of the Secretary in the enforce-
ment of the wage provisions of the FLSA is minimal."' 32
The court finally asserted that it is the right and the duty of the
126. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 5.
127. Id at 5-7, (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-14, 622 (1977)); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). See generaly Note, Excessive Entanglements:A New
Dimension to the ParochialAid Controversy Under the First 4mendment, 3 Loy. CHI. L.J. 73,
81-82 (1972).
128. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 6.
129. Id at 7.
130. Id This is the same interest which the Seventh Circuit upheld in Mitchell v. Pilgrim
Holiness Church, 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954), a similar fact
situation analyzed under the free exercise clause. See notes 91-95 and accompanying text
supra. The Mitchell court indicated the governmental interest in the following statement:
"Here we have a remedial measure seeking to insure to the workers of the United States
engaged in the production of goods for commerce a minimum wage sufficient to maintain a
minimum standard of living which Congress deemed to be necessary to their well-being."
210 F.2d at 884.
131. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 7 (emphasis in the original). See note 126 and
accompanying text supra.
132. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 8. The court had previously stated that "the
audit procedures herein are no more onerous or intrusive than those required by the tax
exemption approved in Waiz, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Secretary,
neither statutorily nor by reason of this opinion, has wholesale license . . . to institute a




judiciary, in such a controversy, to determine whether the interest in
maintaining an orderly society intrudes on religion in an unconstitu-
tional and not a theological sense. The court concluded by stating, "[I]t
is with this principle in mind that this Court finds no constitutional
infirmity in the application of the provisions of the FLSA to defend-
ants' educational activities." 33 The case was scheduled to go to trial in
October, 1977, but several days before the trial was to commence the
defendants signed a consent decree and the case was dismissed with
prejudice. 34
Judge Real's utilization of the excessive entanglement test in a la-
bor legislation-religious liberty conflict departed from the precedents of
the Supreme Court's First Amendment freedom of religion deci-
sions. 135 The next section of the note will discuss whether this ex-
panded application of excessive entanglement is justified in view of
prior Court decisions.
III. Excessive Entanglement: A Proper Standard to be
Applied in Labor Legislation Cases?
Had the Marshall court followed the precedents of past labor legis-
lation-religious liberty decisions, it would have decided the case under
the free exercise balancing standard. A consideration of the concepts
underlying the free exercise and establishment clauses, and of the
Court's treatment of cases arising under them, suggests that Marshall
may not be an establishment case in the traditional sense but may be
133. Id at 8. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring opinion); KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
4, at 43.
After the denial of summary judgment, the defendants filed a petition with the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals for writs of mandamus and prohibition. "n this petition the de-
fendants alleged that the enforcement of three discovery orders, allowing the Labor Depart-
ment's representatives to enter the church school premises in order to examine payroll
records, would violate their religious liberty guarantees. Defendants' Petition for Writs of
Mandamus and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 2-4. The Court of Appeals refused to grant
relief by way of mandamus and the defendants then requested that Justice Rehnquist, sitting
as Circuit Justice, stay enforcement of the discovery orders. Justice Rehnquist denied the
defendants' request on procedural grounds and suggested that the Supreme Court would
consider the defendants' constitutional claims, if at all, after the case went to trial at the
district court level followed by an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 434 U.S.
1305, 1309 (1977).
134. The defendants, for the purpose of settlement and without admitting any violations
of the FLSA, agreed to (1) pay plaintiff $650,000 as a total settlement and (2) conform their
pay practices to the equal pay provisions of the FLSA. Stipulation for Future Compliance
and Order of Dismissal with Respect to Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-day Advent-
ists at 1-3, Pacific Union case, supra note 7.
135. See notes 83-107 and accompanying text supra.
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considered under the entanglement test as an application of the concept
of benevolent neutrality. It is therefore necessary to consider whether a
standard for determining the proper test under the religion clauses can
be distilled from prior Supreme Court opinions.
A. Standard for Determining the Proper Test
The religion clauses of the First Amendment are by nature some-
what conflicting, 36 and cases arising under them cannot always be
classified solely as establishment or free exercise problems. 37 Justice
Frankfurter recognized the conflicting nature of the clauses when he
stated that "[amny attempt to formulate a bright-line distinction is
bound to founder."'' 38 The Court's difficulty in this area was further
emphasized by Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Commission:139
"The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Reli-
gion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other."14 Although there are situations in which the two clauses over-
lap, it is significant to note that they prohibit two quite different types
of governmental interference with religious freedom. A free exercise
claim requires a showing of a direct, governmental infringement upon
an individual's religious beliefs or activities, while the establishment
clause may be violated by laws that have the effect of establishing an
official religion, regardless of their impact on individuals. 14 1
The categorization of an issue as free exercise or establishment
may be of great importance. For example, in two of the Sunday-clos-
136. This "conflicting" nature can be observed in a free exercise situation that requires
some accommodation for an individual or religious organization which might be seen as an
establishment of religion. Such a question arose in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
wherein the Court was required to determine whether the exemption from eligibility re-
quirements for unemployment compensation granted to Mrs. Sherbert constituted an "es-
tablishment" of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina. In a discussion
ancillary to the main holding, the Court held that there was no establishment but rather an
implementation of the governmental obligation of neutrality. Id at 409-10.
137. Duffy, A Review of Supreme Court Decisions on Aid to Nonpub/ic Elementary and
Secondary Education, 23 HASTINGS L. J. 966, 967 (1972).
138. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,463 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (197 1); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668-69 (1970).
139. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
140. Id at 668-69.
141. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962). See generally Moore, "Establishment"and
'Tree Exercise," supra note 2, at 142.
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ing cases,' 42 where the Court was required to determine whether an
individual had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legisla-
tive enactment, the Court held that the claimants had standing on the
establishment clause issue but not on the free exercise issue.'43 The
categorization of an issue will also determine which of the two separate
tests will be applied by the Court: free exercise balancing'" or the
three-pronged establishment test. ' 45 These separate tests may result in
a law being declared constitutional as to one clause and unconstitu-
tional as to the other clause.
In considering cases raising establishment or free exercise ques-
tions, the Supreme Court has not advanced specific standard for deter-
mining whether a particular situation requires an application of the
free exercise or the establishment clause test. Historically, however, the
two clauses have been recognized as setting forth separate constitu-
tional requirements.'46 In spite of the fact that a bright-line distinction
cannot be drawn between the two clauses, the Court has provided gen-
eral indications as to whether a case should be considered from the
perspective of the establishment clause or the free exercise clause.
These indications must be isolated as aids in determining whether the
Marshall case should have been considered under the free exercise or
establishment clause or a combination thereof.
In the "typical" establishment case, the primary element is a civil
regulation favoring religion. The Supreme Court establishment deci-
sions have all involved some type of governmental aid to religion. 147
On the other hand, the primary purpose of free exercise is to prevent a
"disfavoring" or prohibition of religion through "coercion against per-
142. Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961). See note 60 supra.
143. 366 U.S. at 592; 366 U.S. at 529-30. See Moore, "Establishment" and "Free Exer-
cise, " supra note 2, at 147.
144. See notes 51-57 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 25-43 and accompanying text supra.
146. Moore, "Establishment" and 'Tree Exercise," supra note 2, at 147, 149. See
generally Duffy, .4 Review of Supreme Court Decisions on Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 966, 967 (1972). For a discussion of free exercise
and establishment clause values and tests, see notes 18-57 and accompanying text supra.
147. Moore, "Establishment" and "Free Exercise,"supra note 2, at 150 & n.33. See, e.g.,
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (textbooks and instructional materials); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (aid to private colleges); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975) (textbooks); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (money grants and tuition reimbursements); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973) (construction financing); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413
U.S. 472 (1973) (testing and record-keeping costs); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(construction grants); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption).
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sonal religious practices."'' 48 It should be noted that a law disfavoring
religion could be dealt with under either clause because "establish-
ment" requires that legislation must neither advance nor inhibit reli-
gion. 149 However, these "disestablishment" cases have traditionally
been dealt with under the free exercise clause.' 50 Consequently, the
religion clause cases have generally fallen into two categories: prohibi-
tive coercion and advancement. The cases dealing with some prohibi-
tory effect on religion or the practice thereof have been viewed as
raising free exercise considerations,' 5' while situations involving the
advancement of religion through governmental involvement have been
analyzed under the establishment clause.'
52
In some circumstances, however, the two clauses may conflict.
This conflict between the requirements of each clause can most readily
be observed in the situation where the legislature is forced to grant a
religious exemption to a law of general application in order to accom-
modate an individual's right to the free exercise of religion. 53 If the
state grants such an exemption, the question arises whether this accom-
modation constitutes an establishment of religion. 154 The Court's opin-
ion in Sherbert v. Verner155 suggests that in some instances, in spite of
148. Moore, "Establishment" and "Free Exercise," supra note 2, at 148, 151.
149. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
150. Moore, "Establishment" and 'Tree Exercise, "supra note 2, at 151.
151. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (state educational requirement interfering with Amish beliefs);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits for refusal
to work on Saturdays); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 630 (1961)
(economic loss from Sunday-closing laws); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601-02 (1961)
(economic loss from Sunday-closing laws).
152. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (textbooks and instructional
materials); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (aid to private colleges);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (textbooks); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (money grants and tuition reimbursements); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (construction financing); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (testing and record-keeping costs)- Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (construction grants); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (anti-evolutionary limitation on public school study); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (19t3) (Bible reading);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (re-
lease time for religious instruction); Illinois ex. rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948)(release time for religious instruction); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I
(1947) (bus transportation).
153. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
154. See Dodge, Sociological Approach, supra note 19, at 705; Giannella, Religious
Liberqy, supra note 75, at 1398-99.
155. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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the prohibition against establishment, the free exercise clause requires
the legislature to grant a special religious exemption to accommodate
the free exercise rights of the individual,1 56 and that this accommoda-
tion does not in fact constitute a violation of the establishment
clause.15 7
It is in this area of tension between the two clauses that the
Supreme Court has attempted to apply the concept of neutrality in or-
der to accommodate the competing interests of the establishment and
free exercise clauses.' 58 The establishment clause, viewed alone, re-
quires a strict neutrality between government and religion. However,
the judicially-created concept of benevolent neutrality balances free ex-
ercise against establishment and is weighted in favor of free exercise.
The operation of this concept is described by Professor Kauper:
In order to advance religious freedom or the religious interest of
the people or in order to prevent discrimination on religious
grounds in its laws or programs, government in some cases may,
and in other cases must, subordinate the strict neutrality in reli-
gious matters required by the establishment clause to the larger
and relative neutrality inspired by the necessity of balancing es-
tablishment against free exercise. The accommodation concept
becomes the judicial vehicle for harmonizing the two clauses in
the interests of this larger and benevolent neutrality which in an
over-all sense is directed to the end of protecting and advancing
religious liberty.' 59
If unlimited accommodation were allowed, however, it would defeat
the purpose of the establishment clause. It was therefore necessary to
develop a test to determine the permissible degree and extent of in-
volvement between government and religion. The Supreme Court in
Walz v. Tax Commission 160 introduced the excessive entanglement test
to provide such a standard. 161 The Court recognized the need for a
156. Id at 409-10. The special exemption requirement is restricted to the narrow area
where the legislation in question imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise rights of a
class of citizens. Dodge, Sociological-Approach, supra note 19, at 705. In addition, Professor
Giannella asserts that "[the courts will not require the state to grant an exemption from
economic regulations to religious interests, if a preferential benefit would be conferred."
Giannella, Religious Liberty, supra note 75, at 1398.
157. 374 U.S. at 409-10. See KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4,
at 20; Dodge, Sociological Approach, supra note 19, at 705. See generally Kauper, Walz
Decision, supra note 23, at 295.
158. For a general discussion of the concepts of neutrality and accommodation, see
Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert, supra note 72, at 3.
159. Id at 27-28.
160. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
161. Id at 674. In evaluating the underlying policy considerations, it is important to
consider the reasons advanced by the Court for applying the entanglement standard. Two
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"benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference."'' 62 The acceptance of
benevolent neutrality indicated the Court's intention to allow the great-
est possible area in which free exercise could flourish; at the same time,
the development of the entanglement test indicated the Court's concern
that the involvement allowed under benevolent neutrality would not
constitute a violation of the establishment clause.
Since freedom of religion cases do not always fall under one clause
or the other, there is a gray area between them where the Court has
attempted to apply this concept of benevolent neutrality. Statutes
which do not violate the principle of strict neutrality because their pri-
mary purpose and effect' neither advance nor inhibit religion, but which
do constitute some degree of church-state involvement, would fall into
the area of benevolent neutrality and would be measured against the
excessive entanglement standard. Although cases dealing with "dises-
tablishment" of religion have traditionally been treated as free exercise
questions, it can be argued that they can also be considered under the
establishment clause. Because of the Court's interpretation that estab-
lishment protects against both advancement and inhibition of religion,
the governmental action in question could be measured under the ex-
cessive entanglement standard to determine whether the resultant
church-state relationship is impermissibly entangling.
Although the Marshall court's expanded application of excessive
entanglement may therefore be justifiable, Judge Real should have
given the defendants' free exercise claim more careful consideration.
Since different tests are employed by the Court to determine constitu-
such reasons were suggested in Walz: first, to protect religion and religious institutions from
governmental interference with religious beliefs and practices, id at 661-70, and second, to
prevent religio-political strife, id at 676. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilon, supra note 41, at
171; Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From Separation to Dlcnte in Church-State
Relations, 55 N.C.L. REv. 563, 569 (1977); Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian
Schools:A Final Installment?, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 57, 65; Zoetewey, Excessive Entanglement:
Development of a Guideline for Assessing Acceptable Church-State Relationshps, 3 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 279, 287 (1976).
Since it is recognized that some church-state involvement is inevitable in government
aid cases, the entanglement test was created to delineate the boundaries of what constitutes
permissible governmental involvement. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 670.
162. 397 U.S. at 669. The Walz Court stated the effect of this principle: "Each value
judgement under the Religion Clauses must therefore turn on whether particular acts in
question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the
effect of doing so. Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommoda-
tion of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement
that would tip the balance toward governmental control of churches or governmental re-
straint on religious practice." Id at 669-70.
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tionality under each of the clauses, it is possible for a party to prevail
under one test but not under the other.16
3
B. A Free Exercise Analysis
The free exercise challenge, which the Marshall court dismissed
without extended discussion, was the very basis of the religious liberty
claims of the defendants.'I They adamantly maintained that their free
exercise of religion would be seriously burdened by the Secretary of
Labor's interference with the church's employer-employee relationship
in religious schools.' 65 Once these free exercise claims were advanced,
the court should have determined whether the defendants had standing
to sue under the free exercise clause, and if they did, it should have
applied the balancing test.
In applying the free exercise test, a court has to determine whether
there is the coercion of a religious belief which is necessary for standing
under the free exercise clause. 166 The Marshall court determined that
an application of the FLSA to the defendants did not impinge on their
religious beliefs because the defendants did not believe in sex discrimi-
nation. 167 The defendants were not arguing, however, that sex discrim-
ination itself was protected by the First Amendment, but rather that
they should be free from governmental involvement in the relationship
between the church and its religious employees. 6 Therefore, the de-
fendants arguably had a free exercise belief that was affected by the
FLSA equal pay provisions and should have been granted standing.
If standing were established, the defendants would have been re-
quired to illustrate the importance of the religious practice for which
the exemption was requested, and to show that there was governmental
interference with that practice. 169 On the other hand, the government
would have been required to show that it had a compelling interest in
denying a religious exemption to the FLSA's equal pay provisions. In
order to overcome such a showing, the defendants would have to con-
vince the court that the privity of their church employer-employee rela-
163. See notes 142-45 and accompanying text supra.
164. For a summary of the defendants' free exercise claims and the Marshall court's
treatment of them, see notes 116-24 and accompanying text supra.
165. Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 2.
See Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 Sup. Ct. 1231
(1978); Caufield v. Hirsch, 46 U.S.L.W. 2025 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1977).
166. See note 60 supra.
167. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
168. See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
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tionship is of great importance to the exercise of their religious mission,
and that the Labor, Department's enforcement procedures would con-
stitute an impermissible burden on this exercise of religion.
An analysis of the present action indicates that the government
would very likely be able to show a compelling interest in denying a
religious exemption to the nondiscriminatory application of this reme-
dial labor legislation. The government could show the importance of
the social and economic values underlying the FLSA,170 and that there
was no less restrictive alternative available.171 In contrast, it appears
unlikely that the defendants would be able to show that the minimal
Labor Department actions would interfere with their free exercise of
religion.172 If it had applied the balancing standard, the Marshall court
would therefore probably have reached the same conclusion that it did
under the excessive entanglement analysis.
As has been discussed in a previous section, 173 the Marshall court
also could have considered this case under the establishment clause as
an application of benevolent neutrality if the free exercise claim was
dismissed for lack of standing or on the merits.
C. The Establishment Clause Analysis
If standing were denied under the free exercise clause, the only
170. The Supreme Court recognized the social and economic importance underlying the
equal pay provisions of the FLSA in Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
The opinion referred to the congressional purpose underlying the Equal Pay Act, which was
"to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment dis-
crimination in private industry." Id at 195. In discussing the importance of the Act, Secre-
tary of Labor Wirtz stated: "The present practice of paying discriminatory wage rates on the
basis of sex has an undesirable effect on many aspects of the life of our Nation. It tends to
affect adversely the general purchasing power and the living standard of workers. It offers
an unfair competitive advantage for employers who follow this practice. The resulting low
wage levels often prevents [sic] the maximum utilization of worker skills to the detriment of
morale and, in turn, of production." 109 CONG. Rac. 2889 (1963) (statement of Secretary
Wirtz). For a discussion of the background and legislative history of the Equal Pay Act, see
Ross & McDermott, supra note 111, at 2-6.
171. If the government were able to show that a significant number of non-clergy em-
ployees were covered by the Act, it would be able to prove that a religious exemption would
entail actual harm to the total regulatory program.
172. The Marshall court, under its excessive entanglement analysis, found that the Labor
Department's proposed actions would constitute a minimal interference with the defendants'
First Amendment rights, and that the resulting involvement was no more intrusive than that
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. o64 (1970). See note
132 and accompanying text supra. The Labor Department actions under the Equal Pay Act
consist of investigation of employers' wage scales either as a result of a complaint or pursu-
ant to a random general investigation. Murphy, Female Wage Discrimiatlion: A Study of the
Equal Pay Act 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 615, 622 (1970).
173. See notes 158-62 and accompanying text supra.
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alternative would have been to attack the legislation as a violation of
the establishment clause. The FLSA has a secular purpose, and it is
not a law having the primary effect of advancing religion. Conse-
quently, in order to bring this case within the confines of the establish-
ment clause it would be necessary to show that enforcement of this
statute against the defendant religious organization would constitute an
inhibition of religion. This "disestablishment" approach is not a com-
mon one, but it appears that a court may hold a law to be in violation
of the First Amendment if it in some way works to "destroy" rather
than encourage religion.'74 The Marshall action could therefore be de-
cided under the excessive entanglement test because the second prong
of the Supreme Court's establishment clause analysis speaks in terms of
preventing the government from aiding or inhibiting religion.'75
The government's proposed action in Marshall arguably consti-
tuted an indirect inhibition of the defendants' religious practices since
it involved governmental regulation and investigation of the defend-
ants' relationship with its religious employees. 176 The concept of be-
nevolent neutrality, however, requires that the government allow the
greatest area possible in which religion can flourish. 177 There is always
some danger of governmental intrusion into religious activities either
through a posture of aid or inhibition. The dangers of governmental
intrusion can be minimized through doctrines directly limiting the en-
tanglement of government in religious affairs. It was for the specific
purpose of limiting this governmental involvement that the excessive
entanglement doctrine was introduced. 178 Even though the entangle-
ment test was conceived to deal with the relationship between govern-
ment and religion resulting from governmental aid, it can be argued
that the same basic concern, that of governmental interference with re-
ligious beliefs or practices, is engendered by governmental involvement
with religion under labor legislation. It is therefore logical to conclude
that the excessive entanglement test can also be applied to situations
where the government becomes involved with a religious organization
through its implementation of remedial labor legislation where that in-
volvement constitutes a disestablishment or inhibition of religion.' 79
174. See note 20 and accompanying text supra; see also Pacific Union case, supra note 7,
at 5.
175. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See notes 20 & 149 and accom-
panying text supra.
176. See notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 158-62 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
179. See Comment, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 6, at 661.
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The Marshall court's application of the entanglement standard, even
though not suggested by prior court decisions, was thus a reasonable
extension of the excessive entanglement doctrine.
It appears that the Marshall court would have reached the same
result through an application of either the free exercise balancing stan-
dard or the three-pronged establishment test. However, in two recent
cases involving similar constitutional issues, the courts applied both
free exercise and establishment clause standards and reached results
contrary to the holding in Marshall.8 '
D. Recent Decisions
1. Caulfeld v. Hirsch
In July, 1977, a federal district court held in Caulfield v. Hirsch'8 '
that the application of the Taft Act' 82 to parochial schools, allowing the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to conduct a representative
election among lay teachers for Catholic elementary schools, violated
both the free exercise and establishment clauses.' 83 Even though the
Caupfield court considered establishment clause values, the decision
was based primarily on free exercise grounds.'84
Under a free exercise analysis the court examined several specific
concerns arising from the church-state relationship under the Taft Act.
The court took into account the pervasive authority of the Board over
180. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), ceri. granted, 98 S. Ct.
1231 (1978); Caulfield v. Hirsch, summarized in 46 U.S.L.W. 2025 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1977).
For an extensive discussion of the free exercise questions raised in these cases, see Comment,
Free Exercise Clause, supra note 6.
181. See Summary, 46 U.S.L.W. 2025 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1977).
182. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). The purpose of the
Act is to prevent industrial strife and promote the free flow of commerce. The authority of
the National Labor Relations Board is derived from the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). The Board has the authority to make rules and regulations and
has a wide scope of powers to prevent unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. §§ 156-161 (1976).
Under the FLSA, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor has broad powers to investigate and inspect records, question employees, make regu-
lations and orders and institute injunction proceedings and file complaints. 29 U.S.C. §§
201-219 (1976).
183. See 46 U.S.L.W. at 2025.
184. In considering the free exercise claims, the court looked to Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), see notes 76-82 and accompanying text supra, for a three part test. This test
requires a court to "(1) ascertain whether the claims presented were religious not secular;, (2)
determine whether the religious conduct was burdened or constrained in some cognizable
fashion by reason of the application of the legislation in question; and (3) inquire whether
the interest sought to be protected by the legislation is sufficiently compelling to override the
interest in permitting an unburdened exercise of religion." 46 U.S.L.W. 2025.
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the employment area and its authority to compel bargaining on terms
and conditions of employment. 85 It also noted that the divisiveness of
a competitive interface between lay and religious teachers would harm
the religious mission of the school. 186 Finally, it was asserted that the
free exercise clause was violated because the Board would be required
to interpret ecclesiastical concerns.187 The court determined that there
was a burden on free exercise: "To governmentally compel the schools
to bargain with a union over ecclesiastical concerns would certainly
constitute a constraint upon the free exercise of religion. The crux of
the problem is that the terms and conditions of employment at some
point become inseparable from the religious mission of the schools." 188
Since a burden on free exercise was shown, the court went on to
consider whether the government could demonstrate the compelling in-
terest necessary to the infringement of the schools' First Amendment
right. In this regard:
The importance of the Taft Act's purpose is not questioned; how-
ever, in balancing the competing interests, the schools' religious
liberty interest must prevail. In this sensitive constitutional area,
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible governmental limitation. Nonapplica-
tion of the Taft Act to these schools simply does not conjure up
an impression of grave abuses endangering paramount federal
interests.' 89
After resolving the free exercise claims in favor of the schools, the
court turned to an evaluation of the church-state relationships under
the excessive entanglement doctrine of the establishment clause. The
court noted that the Board has broad investigatory powers which allow
it to compel the church schools to produce information. 190 The Board
also has the authority to bargain over curriculum and teacher discipline
and to determine the validity of employment practices. 9' In view of
these considerations, the court found that the resulting relationships vi-
olated the establishment clause "[b]ecause the entangling relationships
that arise under the Taft Act may result in numerous confficts and con-




188. Id For a discussion of the Marshall defendants' similar free exercise claims, see
note 117 and accompanying text supra.
189. 46 U.S.L.W. at 2025. Cf. Ross & McDermott, supra note 111, at 5 n.26 (importance
of Equal Pay Act).
190. See 46 U.S.L.W. at 2025.
191. Id
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the court's view, excessive .... 1192
The Caulfield decision is significant because the court, although
primarily concerned with the free exercise claim, also applied an estab-
lishment clause analysis to a labor legislation-religious liberty conflict.
The opinion indicates that where these two interests collide, govern-
mental limitations on the exercise of religion will be allowed only when
grave abuses endangering paramount governmental interests are pres-
ent. The Cau/field court did not perceive the nonapplication of the Taft
Act to have this requisite character. The court's decision indicates the
primary importance which it attaches to religious liberty claims in this
sensitive constitutional area.
2. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB
Less than a month after the Cau/field decision, a federal court of
appeals in Catholic Bishop v. NLRB 193 struck down a National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) order that the Catholic bishops in Chicago
and northern Indiana bargain with unions representing lay teachers in
local seminaries and high schools.19 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the NLRB had no jurisdiction in teacher-
employee relationships in parochial schools because such involvement
by a governmental agency would violate First Amendment guarantees
of church-state separation.
The plaintiffs asserted that NLRB jurisdiction over their parochial
school employment relationships would violate their freedom of reli-
gion rights under both the free exercise and establishment clauses. 9 '
The court chose to consider these claims jointly "rather than dwelling
on the differentiations between the dual aspects of the Religion Clauses
of 'establishment' and 'free exercise' of religion."' 96 In order to meas-
ure the constitutionality of an application of the NLRA to the paro-
chial schools, the court focused on several specific concerns arising
from this church-state relationship. The court first considered the es-
sential nature of the schools to determine what effect the required bar-
gaining would have on their function. The court found that parochial
schools involve a substantial religious character, activity and purpose,
and that teachers employed in such institutions are expected to assist in
192. Id
193. 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
194. Id at 1131.
195. Id at 1114.
196. Id at 1131. "Our treatment of the Religion Clauses jointly has been because of our
belief that there has been some blurring of sharply honed differentiations." Id
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carrying out the religious mission of the schools. 197 It was further de-
termined that "the very threshold act of certification of the union" im-
pinges on the bishop's authority198 and that the requirement of
bargaining would impose a chilling effect on the bishop's exercise of
control over the schools' religious mission.199 Looking at the relation-
ships resulting from an application of the NLRA, the court found that
there was bound to be entanglement in doctrinal matters, particularly
in situations of teacher dismissal where the Board would be required to
determine whether the dismissal was for religious reasons or because of
the teacher's involvement in union activities.2"0 The court looked to
the reasonable accommodation doctrine01 to see if some compromise
could be reached, but it was determined that any attempted accommo-
dation would itself constitute excessive governmental involvement.20 2
In reaching the decision that the NLRB had no jurisdiction over
the teacher-employee relationships in parochial schools, the court did
not overlook the substantial importance of the national policy embod-
ied in the National Labor Relations Act. However, the court did not
find this interest to be compelling:
A church which chooses to educate its own young people in
schools which it is required essentially to finance without govern-
mental aid should because of the essentially religious permeation
of its curriculum be equally freed of the obviously inhibiting ef-
fect and impact of the restrictions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in conducting the teaching program of those schools.20 3
In conclusion, the court declared that there was not only sovereign in-
volvement by the NLRB in the religious activity of the church under
the establishment clause but "undoubtedly, in our view, also curtail-
197. Id at 1121-22 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-19 (1971); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975)).
198. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1123. This was said to violate the church law
requiring the bishop to be "the sole repository of authority." Id
199. Id at 1124. The court stated: "The Board's order to bargain unquestionably...
inhibits the bishops' authority to maintain parochial schools in accordance with ecclesiasti-
cal concern." Id at 1123.
200. Id at 1125.
201. See Note, Establshment Clause Neutrali and the Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901 (1977).
202. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1128-30. The court stated: "A 'reasonable
accommodation' by the Board 'to the religious purposes of the school' on the presentation of
a doctrinal issue in an unfair labor practice case would implicitly appear to us to involve the
necessity of explanation and analysis, and probably verification and justification, of the doc-
trinal precept involved, all of which would itself erode the protective wall afforded by the
constitutional right." Id at 1129.
203. Id at 1130.
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ment of the free exercise of religion."2"
The Catholic Bishop decision is significant because it indicates the
willingness of a circuit court to uphold religious liberty interests against
significant and far-reaching governmental labor regulations. The opin-
ion demonstrates, as did the Caufeld decision, that some courts are
beginning to exert control over governmental regulation in the area of
religious employment relationships, and that these courts consider the
religious liberty interest to be of primary importance. Against these
religious liberty claims only paramount governmental interests will
survive.
3. Analysis
These recent decisions appear to be inconsistent with the Marshall
opinion, especially with respect to the courts' differing approaches to
the free exercise claims.205 The free exercise challenges in the three
cases were similar in that "the church" in each case was claiming that
governmental involvement in their employment relationships with pa-
rochial school teachers-a relationship alleged to be a part of the reli-
gious mission of both the Catholic and Seventh-day Adventist churches
and so guided by church doctrine--constituted a violation of their free
exercise right to be free from governmental coercion."z ' The defend-
ants in Marshall asserted that the governmental action under the FLSA
would consist of continuing official surveillance involving extensive re-
view of records, interviews and comparisons ofjob descriptions.207 The
Caulfield and Catholic Bishop defendants similarly claimed that their
free exercise would be burdened by governmental entanglement in doc-
trinal matters, interference with the bishops' authority over parochial
school matters,20 8 possible divisiveness between lay and religious
faculty members and numerous conflicts between the church and the
NLRB.209
Despite the strikingly similar fact situations which gave rise to the
litigation in these cases, it may be possible to distinguish iMarshall from
204. Id at 1131.
205. For a discussion of the Marshall court's free exercise analysis, sce notes 121-24 and
accompanying text supra.
206. Compare Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1122 and Caulfield v. Hirsch, sum-
marizedin 46 U.S.L.W. at 2025 with Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Pro-
hibition, supra note 92, at 4.
207. Defendants' Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, supra note 92, at 4;
-see also Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 2-3.
208. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1123, 1125.
209. See Caulfield v. Hirsch, summarized in 46 U.S.L.W. at 2025.
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the Catholic school cases. It appears that the enforcement of the Taft
Act and the subsequent NLRB regulation and surveillance might con-
stitute a greater burden on the free exercise of the religious mission of
the Catholic school system than would the application of the FLSA to
the Seventh-day Adventist school system.21l In conjunction with this
concern one should also consider the burden imposed by the Taft Act
through the complexity of bargaining and the inherent requirement of
compromise, the adversary nature of the bargaining process and the
tendency toward doctrinal involvement.21 '
In addition, the Caulfield court placed great emphasis on the fact
that the NLRB might become involved with ecclesiastical concerns. If
a lay teacher were disciplined or dismissed, the court pointed out, the
NLRB would be allowed to determine whether the disciplinary action
was for reasons related to the religious mission of the school or to dis-
courage union participation. 2  Such a consideration would require the
Board to interpret a matter of ecclesiastical concern, a matter that ex-
ceeds the limit of the Board's constitutional authority. 3 Echoing the
same concerns, the court in Catholic Bishop devoted a substantial por-
tion of its opinion to a consideration of the possible accommodation
which the NLRB might be required to allow the Catholic schools in
order to prevent interference with ecclesiastical concerns and deci-
sions.2 4 This accommodation in turn might lead to an establishment
of religion.2 15  The accommodation problem would only arise in
210. In the Marshall opinion, Judge Real noted that "[t]he Secretary neither statutorily
nor by reason of his opinion, has wholesale license [as defendants urge] to institute a perva-
sive scheme for supervision of defendants' religious activities." Pacific Union case, supra
note 7, at 7 (footnote omitted). The court went on to state that "[t]here is no indication
whatsoever that such investigations [by the Labor Department] would be any more onerous
than those conducted by other Federal and State authorities to see that health and safety
laws are complied with or checks by the Internal Revenue Service to see that defendants
meet the requirement for income tax exemption." Id at 9 n.3.
211. One commentator noted: "The parochial school teacher cases do not fit into the line
of analysis applied in cases like Mitchell, Marshall and Prince because the NLRA does not
intrude on the freedom of religion as minimally as the FLSA or the child labor laws. None
of these statutes contemplates the broad regulatory framework that is established by the
NLRA. The detailed proscriptions and adjudicative processes necessary to regulate bar-
gaining are simply not germane to the issues of minimum and equal wages or of the protec-
tion of child workers." Comment, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 6, at 668.
212. See 46 U.S.L.W. at 2025.
213. Id For a summary of the jurisdictional limitations of a court over ecclesiastical
matters, see note 119 supra.
214. 559 F.2d at 1128-30. See note 202 supra.
215. 559 F.2d at 1128-30. See Judge Sprecher's concurring opinion, id at 1131. For a
recent discussion of the establishment clause and the reasonable accommodation require-
ment, see Note, Establishment Clause Neutrality and the Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901 (1977).
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Marshall if the court granted the church an exemption from complying
with the requirements of the FLSA.
Finally, the entanglement considerations of these three cases can
be distinguished on the grounds that the relationship between the
NLRB and the Catholic school system required constant and continu-
ing surveillance of and involvement with the parochial school system,
while the Labor Department's investigation of the defendants' pay
scales required only infrequent involvement.21 6 Thus it could be deter-
mined that the Labor Department's investigation of the defendants'
records was a minimal contact which did not exceed the constitutional
bounds of permissible entanglement. 21 7 These distinctions are signifi-
cant but they are not absolute and clear-cut; consequently, it remains to
be seen how the Supreme Court will treat similar claims.2" s
Conclusion
The most significant aspect of the Marshall opinion is Judge Rears
utilization of the excessive entanglement doctrine. His analysis of the
constitutional issues indicates this particular court's willingness to ex-
tend the application of the excessive entanglement doctrine to cases in-
volving a collision between governmental interests, expressed through
nondiscriminatory remedial labor legislation, and First Amendment
free exercise and establishment clause claims. By applying excessive
entanglement to a labor legislation case the opinion represents a signifi-
cant departure from the Supreme Court's application of this doc-
trine,2 1 9 and it remains to be seen whether the courts will generally
apply this extended concept of entanglement.
The Marshall opinion recognized the importance of the religious
liberty interests threatened by governmental regulation of the internal
affairs of a religious organization, but concluded that the societal inter-
est in enforcing equal pay legislation against religious organizations
216. See notes 210 & 211 and accompanying text supra. The Lemon I Court emphasized
that prior decisions did not require total separation between church and state but that they
were concerned with the cumulative impact of governmental involvement with parochial
schools. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton,
supra note 41, at 171, 174.
217. It might be useful to compare the Labor Department's contacts in Marshall with the
governmental contacts in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), a case involving a one-
time, single-purpose construction grant, which the Court found to be "minimal" and conse-
quently not violative of the establishment clause. Id at 688.
218. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Catholic Bishop case so it will have
an opportunity to consider the religious liberty-labor legislation conflict in detail in the next
session of the Court. 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
219. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
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justified the "minimal" interference with the defendants' religious lib-
erty.220 Considered from a religious freedom perspective, there is no
indication that the Marshall decision constitutes a direct curtailment of
religious liberty since the prohibited act (sex discrimination) does not
constitute a religious belief of the Seventh-day Adventist church.22'
However, the application of the FLSA to this religious organization
arguably imposes an indirect burden on the defendants' right to the
free exercise of religion since it does constitute governmental involve-
ment with the employment relationship between the defendant and its
nonclergy employees. It therefore appears that the court should have
weighed the competing interests under the free exercise balancing test.
Judge Real's opinion illustrates the unwillingness of the courts to
grant blanket exemptions from civil laws to religious organizations
claiming absolute First Amendment protection. Whether such a situa-
tion is viewed from the perspective of the free exercise balancing test or
the establishment clause excessive entanglement doctrine, it appears
that courts will not always bar the government from enforcing remedial
labor regulations against individuals or organizations. There is some
question as to how much involvement between church and state the
courts will allow in this sensitive area. There are several court deci-
sions which appear to be in conflict and it seems likely that, in the near
future, the Supreme Court will be faced with the difficult task of deter-
mining the proper relationship between government and religion in the
area of labor relations.
220. Pacific Union case, supra note 7, at 7-8.
221. See notes 123 & 124 and accompanying text supra.
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